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I. INTRODUCTION
The conversion' of rental apartments into condominium or co-
operative ownership is occurring in cities throughout the country.
In Minneapolis, St. Paul, Chicago, Washington, D.C., Boston, and
New York City, many apartment buildings are being converted
and sold to existing tenants as condominiums or cooperatives. 2
t Dean and Professor of Law, St. John's University School of Law.
tt Associate Dean and Associate of Law, St. John's University School of Law.
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1. "A conversion is the sale of individual units in an apartment building by its own-
er to tenants or outside purchasers." Comment, The Regulaton of Rental Apartment Conver-
sions, 8 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 507, 507 (1980).
2. In many jurisdictions, particularly New York, rental apartments are converted
into cooperatives instead of condominiums. This Article is generally applicable to both
condominium and cooperative conversions. Local customs and preferences typically dic-
tate which form will be used. While the terms "condominium" and "cooperative" are
often used interchangably, they are conceptually quite different. A condominium entails
"[i]ndividual ownership in fee simple of a one-family unit in a multi-family structure cou-
pled with ownership of an undivided interest in the land and in all other parts of the
structure held in common with all of the other owners of one-family units." 4B R. Pow-
ELL, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY $ 633.1[2] n.2, at 770 (1981) (citing J. RAMSEY, CON-
DOMINIUM: THE NEW LOOK IN Co-ops 3 (1961)). The condominium owner pays his own
tax bill and his own individual mortgage payment. On the other hand, a cooperative
building is owned by an apartment corporation. Tenant/shareholders own stock in the
1
Rohan and Furlong: The No-buy Pledge: A Potential Tool for Tenants in a Condominium
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1984
WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW
The national trend toward conversion of rental property results
primarily from the increased costs of operation, which have greatly
exceeded rent revenues. This disparity denies landlords a reason-
able return on their investments. The disparity is exacerbated by
rent control laws, which artificially depress rent levels in cities such
as Boston, New York City, and Washington, D.C.3
Developers, who are often the landlords of the rental property, 4
have turned to conversion to reduce the disparity between ex-
penses and rents. A handsome profit is usually available to land-
lords who choose to convert their properties. Many factors enter
into the determination of whether to convert to condominium or
cooperative ownership, including: (1) available individual unit
financing; (2) favorable existing financing on the structure; (3) de-
sire to screen prospective buyers; and (4) the tax consequences of
the transaction.5
A conversion may also be economically advantageous to current
tenants who are financially able to purchase their units in the con-
dominium. Tenants are typically offered a substantial discount on
the prevailing market price.6 As condominium owners, purchasing
tenants will be entitled to deduct mortgage interest and property
tax payments from their federal income taxes. 7 These tenants can
corporation, entitling them to a long-term "proprietary lease" to a particular apartment
in the building. The tenant/shareholders pay monthly maintenance charges to the corpo-
ration. The corporation, in turn, pays the real estate taxes, monthly mortgage payments,
and other bills. See Comment, Tax Aspects of Choosing Between a Cooperative or Condominium
Conversion, 12 CUM. L. REV. 453, 455 (1982). The condominium and cooperative both
have an executive board which oversees the maintenance and operation of the building or
buildings.
3. See, e.g., Emergency Tenant Protection Act, ch. 403, 1983 N.Y. Laws 698 (McKin-
ney 1983) (combining New York City's Rent Control Law and Rent Stabilization Law
into one statewide rent control system).
4. Landlords, developers, and sponsors will generically be referred to as "converters"
throughout this Article.
5. For a discussion of the tax considerations when converting to condominium form
of ownership, see Boris, Co-ops and Condominiiuns Capital Gain on Conversion and Other Problems,
40 INST. ON FED. TAX'N § 22.01 (1982); Kaster, Co-Ops and Condombhins-- The Sponsor's
Viewpoint, 28 INST. ON FED. TAX'N 99 (1970); Kaster, Residential Co-ops and Condomitiums
Development Projects and Conversions Promoter's Tax Techniques, 38 INST. ON FED. TAX'N
§ 13.01 (1980); Comment, supra note 2.
6. See Wissner v. 15 W. 72nd St. Assoc., 87 A.D.2d 120, 450 N.Y.S.2d 790 (App. Div.
1982) (25% discount). Purchase by existing tenants is essential to the developer in jurisdic-
tions where a minimum number of occupying tenants are required by law to purchase
before a building may be converted. See, e.g., N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAw § 352eeee (McKinney
Supp. 1982-1983).
7. Section 164 of the Internal Revenue Code permits a condominium owner to de-
duct state and local property taxes assessed on his condominium unit. See I.R.C. § 164
[Vol. 10
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also expect to realize a substantial gain upon the sale of their units
because of the increasing value of the condominium.
Despite the advantages to purchasing tenants, almost all conver-
sions are met by tenant opposition. Although many tenants would
like to become owners, most of them are unable to do so. Some
tenants may be unable to obtain financing, while others cannot
afford the total monthly carrying costs of the unit. Tenants who
have the ability to purchase may simply not want to purchase,
choosing instead to remain in a rental arrangement. Conse-
quently, many tenants are opposed to a proposed conversion
which may result in the eviction of non-purchasing tenants.8
It has become commonplace, therefore, for tenants faced with a
conversion of their building to band together. A device which en-
ables tenants to unite is the "no-buy pledge," a simple contract
which binds tenants to refrain from purchasing a unit. This Arti-
cle examines the legal ramifications of the no-buy pledge, taking
into account the perspectives of all the parties involved in a con-
version. The Article then analyzes the various issues concerning
the validity of the no-buy pledge, summarizing and comparing the
judicial decisions arising thereunder. Finally, the Article discusses
the different types of no-buy pledges, suggesting a model no-buy
pledge for consideration. The New York experience provides the
necessary focal point for this inquiry, as a considerable amount of
conversion activity occurs in New York City, and because the New
York courts have carefully scrutinized the no-buy pledge.
II. CONVERSION PROCESS AND DEFINITIONS
The conversion process in New York City involves a complex
sequence of events. First, the attorney for the converter prepares
an offering plan containing all the pertinent information and facts
of the proposed conversion. This plan is simultaneously submitted
to the Attorney General's office and to the existing tenants. The
(West Supp. 1983). Section 163 of the code allows condominium owners to deduct interest
paid on a mortgage loan. Id § 163. For co-operative housing tenant stockholders, section
216 of the Internal Revenue Code allows some deduction of taxes, interest, and business
depreciation. See id. § 216.
8. In New York City, non-purchasing tenants can only be evicted if a building is
converted pursuant to an "eviction plan," whereby a majority of existing tenants agree to
purchase. N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 352eeee(1)(c) (McKinney Supp. 1982-1983). Non-
purchasing tenants may still remain for three years after the conversion offering has been
declared effective. Id § 352eeee(2)(d)(ii). Any conversion involving a lesser number of
existing tenant/purchasers is characterized as a "non-eviction plan." Id. § 352eeee(1)(b).
Tenants cannot be evicted under a "non-eviction plan." Id § 352eeee(2)(c)(ii).
19841
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Attorney General's office reviews the plan to ascertain whether it
contains any fraudulent schemes or devices. This process can take
four to six months. Once the Attorney General's office determines
that the offering has been completely and accurately described,
the proposed plan is "accepted for filing" and the final offering
plan is presented to the tenants.9 By this time, the tenants in the
building have usually organized a tenants' association. The terms
of the proposed offering are often unacceptable to many of the
tenants. This factor alone serves to unite the tenants. Next, the
tenants' association hires an experienced lawyer.' 0 This lawyer
provides the association with certain services including: (1) advice
on how to organize; (2) attendance at all public tenants' meetings;
(3) analysis of the conversion offering; and (4) formulation of a
legal strategy which will enable the tenants to negotiate as a uni-
fied block. This strategy typically includes preparation and distri-
bution of a no-buy pledge.
The no-buy pledge consists of an agreement among the tenants
not to purchase an apartment in the building until the tenants'
executive committee, acting on the advice of counsel, votes to ac-
cept the offering and release the tenants from the pledge, or until
certain conditions are met. These conditions might include mak-
ing the financing arrangements for conversion more affordable for
the tenants or changing the plan from an eviction plan to a non-
eviction plan."
9. Id § 352eeee.
10. An attorney representing a tenant's association must be cautious. "No-buy pledg-
es" might not be signed by each member of the association and where all members sign,
some may not adhere to the agreement. Therefore, members of a tenants' association may
end up suing each other. The attorney representing the association may be subject to
disqualification under the Code of Professional Responsibility.
In Wilshire Tenant Ass'n v. Spiegel, the defendants, seven tenants alleged to have vio-
lated a "no-buy pledge," moved to disqualify the attorney for the tenants' association.
N.Y.L.J., Nov. 12, 1981, at 12, col. 1. The defendants argued that the association's attor-
ney was violating DR 5-105, which prohibits an attorney from representing a client where
his judgment is adversely affected from acting on behalf of another client. See id.; see also
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 5-105 (1980). The Spiegel Court
stated that Ethical Consideration 5-18 provides that an attorney representated by a corpo-
ration or similar business entity does not owe a duty to the individuals of the entity, but
only to the entity itself. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 5-18
(1980). Therefore, the Spiegel court denied defendant's motion for disqualification.
N.Y.L.J., Nov. 12, 1981, at 12, col. I.
11. There are many different forms of a no-buy pledge agreement. Each has its own
unique mechanism for releasing the signers. Set forth below are several typical release
clauses:
TENANT PROMISES AND WARRANTS that he will not execute a subscrip-
tion agreement for the purchase of any shares for any apartment located at
[Vol. 10
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The no-buy pledge agreement frequently contains a stipulation
that it will be unenforceable until a specified number of tenants
have agreed to its terms, and that it will expire after a specified
date. 12 No-buy pledges commonly contain a promise by the sign-
ing tenants not to bargain with the converting landlord except
through the officers and counsel for the tenants' association. 13 Vir -
tually all pledge agreements contain a paragraph stating that the
terms of the pledge may be enforced by an injunction 14 and that
the party signing the pledge consents to service of process by regis-
tered or certified mail.
__ ., New York, New York, pursuant to any plan to convert the building to
Cooperative Ownership until one of the two events designated below occurs:
(a) A period of time, whose duration is eighteen (18) months and one (1) day
after the date of the presentation of a plan which is filed in the Attorney Gen-
eral's office; or
(b) The above plan or any amendment to such plan which is accepted for filing
by the Attorney General's Office is "approved" by fifty five percent (55%) of the
tenants in occupancy at the date of the presentation of such plan or amendment.
Such "approval" must be in writing, and must indicate that each tenant is pre-
pared to execute a subscription agreement.
(c) You will be released by a majority vote of the Executive Committee when it
determines that it has obtained substantially the best available terms and condi-
tions from the Sponsor upon which the Sponsor is willing to convert the building
to cooperative ownership. Release by the Executive Committee is not intended
to infer that it has approved the plan or determined that the terms are accepta-
ble or favorable to the signers of the contract.
(d) I will not purchase or agree to purchase any apartment in the building
pursuant to any plan to convert the building to cooperative ownership during
the term of this Pledge Agreement, until an amendment to such Plan is accepted
for filing by the Attorney General's Office which incorporates the recommenda-
tions that shall be set forth in a report of the Tenants Steering Committee and
countersigned by the Attorney for the Tenants Committee.
No-buy pledges which can be released only upon a majority vote of the executive commit-
tee present a significant problem. If the committee is composed primarily of stalwart op-
ponents to the conversion plan, the vast majority of the tenants in the building could be
prevented from purchasing their apartments. See 2 P. ROHAN & M. RESKIN, COOPERA-
TIVE HOUSING LAW & PRACTICE § 6.11, at 6-131 (1983).
12. This date is usually one year to eighteen months after the conversion plan was
accepted for filing by the governmental agency charged with overseeing the offering to the
public.
In New York City, a conversion offering plan must be declared effective within fifteen
months from the date of acceptance of the final plan by the attorney general. See N.Y.
GEN. Bus. LAW § 352eeee(2)(a) (McKinney Supp. 1982-1983). Therefore, the expiration
date on no-buy pledges to be used in New York City conversions will typically be one day
after fifteen months from the date the plan was accepted for filing.
13. See supra note 11.
14. Courts may hesitate to issue an injunction absent this provision. In Wilshire Ten-
ants Ass'n v. Spiegel, N.Y.L.J., Nov. 12, 1981, at 12, col. 1, the court held that a prelimi-
nary injunction would not be granted to a tenants' committee seeking to enforce a no-buy
pledge executed prior to a change from an eviction plan to a non-eviction plan. The court
ruled that since the tenants' rights of continued occupancy were not threatened by the
non-eviction plan, irreparable harm could not be demonstrated. Id.
19841
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The no-buy pledge may enable tenants to negotiate more
favorable terms or to block the proposed conversion completely.
The pledge works most effectively in jurisdictions where the law
requires a certain percentage of tenants to purchase apartments
before a building can be converted. Within such a framework, an
effective no-buy pledge signed by a majority of existing tenants
can shift the balance of power from the converter to the tenants.
In New York City, for example, an "eviction plan" 15 to convert a
rental building cannot be declared effective unless fifty-one per-
cent of the existing bona fide tenants in occupancy agree to
purchase their units. 16 If more than fifty-one percent of the ten-
ants execute a no-buy pledge they can block the implementation
of an eviction plan. As a result, the converter is forced to negotiate
with the tenants' association.
The no-buy pledge can also assist tenants in jurisdictions with-
out statutory minimum percentage requirements, in that the pres-
entation of an organized and unified tenants' position can still
compel the owner to negotiate.' 7 Landlords and developers in
15. An "eviction plan" is:
A Plan which . . can result in the eviction of a non-purchasing tenant by rea-
son of the tenant failing to purchase pursuant thereto, and which may not be
declared effective until at least fifty-one percent of the bona fide tenants in occu-
pancy of all dwelling units in the building. . . on the date the offering statement
or prospectus was accepted for filing by the attorney general .. .shall have
executed and delivered written agreements to purchase under the plan pursuant
to an offering ...
N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAw § 352eeee(l)(c) (McKinney Supp. 1982-1983).
16. Section 352eeee previously provided that an eviction plan was valid where thirty-
five percent of the bona fide tenants agreed to purchase, but was amended in 1982 to the
fifty-one percent requirement. See N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 352eeee(l)(c) (McKinney Supp.
1982-1983). As a result of the amendment, no-buy pledges no longer need the signatures
of sixty-five percent of the tenants. Rather, only fifty-one percent or more of the tenants
need to sign to effectively block an eviction plan. See id Dean Rohan and Melvin Reskin
havc stated that:
[T]here are only a few ordinances in effect today which require that a certain
precentage [sic] of tenants must either approve of conversion or agree to
purchase units before the conversion can proceed. However, some ordinances
have tenant approval provisions which exempt the conversion from other statu-
tory requirements if the required tenant approval is obtained. . . .The City of
Newport Beach, California requires that at least 30 percent of the tenants ex-
press written interest in exercising their option to purchase their unit. San Fran-
cisco's conversion ordinance states that an application for conversion may not be
filed unless 40 percent of the tenants have either signed intent to purchase forms,
or indicate that they are eligible for, and interested in, lifetime leases. Those
qualifying for lifetime leases are included in the 40 percent needed for
conversion.
P. ROHAN & M. RESKIN, CONDOMINIUM LAW AND PRACTICE § 3A.05[4], at 3A-16.225
(1983).
17. Minnesota statutes, for example, do not require that a minimum percentage of
(Vol. 10
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these jurisdictions cannot ignore tenants' concerns because existing
tenants constitute a built-in market of potential purchasers which
the developer can tap at little or no cost.
III. CHALLENGES TO THE No-Buy PLEDGE
A. The No-Buy Pledge as an Anitrust Vlai'on
In light of state and federal antitrust statutes, 8 careful consider-
ation should be given to the use of the no-buy pledge. Should
these statutes be found applicable to the no-buy pledge the pros-
pect of treble damages is both real' 9 and significant. 20 This section
discusses potential state and federal antitrust obstacles to the no-
buy pledge and how they may be overcome.
tenants purchase their units in order to complete the conversion plan. Nonetheless, Min-
nesota obligates the declarant to give each tenant and subtenant in possession of a residen-
tial unit 120 days notice prior to compelling them to vacate. See MINN. STAT. § 515A.4-
110(a) (1982). The tenant of each unit has the first option to purchase that unit for 60
days from the time the notice ofconversion is mailed or delivered. See id § 515A.4-1 10(b).
If the tenant fails to exercise this option during the 60-day period, the declarant may not
offer to dispose of the unit at terms more favorable than those offered to the tenant. See id
These statutory provisions work to keep the tenants in the buildings as buyers. A no-buy
pledge agreement can work to achieve the same result by forcing the landlord to negotiate.
A number of interests are promoted when tenants become buyers. The developer
profits by retaining tenants as buyers in most conversion projects. It ensures a minimum
of public controversy and protects the all-important reputation of the developer who con-
templates long-term involvement in the real estate market. See B. LUKERMANN, M. PIN-
KERTON, T. ANDING, L. BROWN, N. HOMANS & R. SMITH, TWIN CITIES CONVERSIONS
OF THE REAL ESTATE KIND 16 (Pub. No. CURA 81-5, 1981).
Tenants also benefit by purchasing their unit. The tenant-buyer receives a more
favorable purchase agreement; it enables him to invest in an ownership opportunity at a
fair monthly cost with an expectation for investment gains; it provides an alternative form
of owner occupied housing for neighborhood residents; and it ensures that the individual
can remain in the building he selected for location and structural characteristics and bene-
fit from the improvements made to the remodeled unit. Id. at 23-24.
18. See, e.g., Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1976); Minnesota Antitrust
Law of 1971, MINN. STAT. §§ 325D.49-.66 (1982); New Jersey Antitrust Act, N.J. REV.
STAT. §§ 56:9-1 to -19 (Supp. 1983-1984); Donnelly Act, N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW §§ 340-47
(McKinney 1968 & Supp. 1982-1983).
19. 15 U.S.C. § 15. The Clayton Act provides:
Any person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason of any-
thing forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefor in any district court . .
and shall recover threefold the damages by him sustained, and the cost of suit,
including a reasonable attorney's fee.
Id The purpose of treble damages is to deter potential violators and compensate victims
for their injuries. Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, reh'g denied, 434 U.S. 881
(1977); Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477 (1977).
20. Antitrust suits frequently involve claims for damages in excess of a million dollars.
See, e.g., Affiliated Capital Corp. v. City of Houston, 700 F.2d 226 (5th Cir. 1983) (dam-
ages over $2 million).
1984]
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Section one of the Sherman Antitrust Act prohibits "every [un-
reasonable] 2' contract, combination. . . or conspiracy in restraint
of trade .... "22 The Sherman Act has been construed to forbid
several types of economic restraints23 including boycotts, 24 which
are concerted refusals to deal. 25 The no-buy pledge is a concerted
refusal by prospective condominium buyers to deal with a con-
verter. As a result, the no-buy pledge could be characterized as a
classic boycott.
26
Boycotts are considered manifestly anticompetitive.2 7  Thus,
once a boycott is found to exist many courts apply a per se analy-
sis.28 Under a per se analysis, the antitrust plaintiff is not required
to prove that the no-buy pledge actually had an anticompetitive
effect. 29 If the plaintiff establishes that the defendant engaged in
an activity characterized as a per se restraint, the defendant is
21. Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
22. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976).
23. See id. § 1-2. For example, cartels, refusals to deal, tying arrangements, price
fixing, monopolies, price discrimination, market allocation, and customer restrictions. See
generally P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW (1978).
24. United States v. General Motors Corp., 384 U.S. 127 (1966); Silver v. New York
Stock Exchange, 373 U.S. 341 (1963); Radiant Burners, Inc. v. Peoples Gas, Light and
Coke Co., 364 U.S. 656 (1961); Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207
(1959); Fashion Originators' Guild of America, Inc. v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457 (1941); Eastern
States Retail Lumber Dealers' Ass'n v. United States, 234 U.S. 600 (1914).
25. Bartholomew v. Virginia Chiropractors Ass'n, 612 F.2d 812 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
446 U.S. 938 (1980). "Boycott" is derived from actions taken by disgruntled Irish tenant
farmers against Captain C. Boycott, a British army officer. See THE RANDOM HOUSE
DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 177 (1971).
26. Typically, in cases brought under the Sherman Act, a formal agreement to boy-
cott will not exist. See Wilder Enterprises v. Allied Artists Pictures Corp., 632 F.2d 1135,
1141 (4th Cir. 1980); see also United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 1 (1948);
Frey & Son v. Cudahy Packing Co., 256 U.S. 208 (1921). In many boycott cases, the main
issue is whether a concerted refusal to deal exists. See Wilder, 632 F.2d at 1141. The no-
buy pledge, a signed contractual refusal to deal, would not present this issue.
27. Boycott agreements, "no less than those to fix minimum prices, cripple the free-
dom of traders and thereby restrain their ability to sell in accordance with their own
judgment." Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Seagram & Sons, 340 U.S. 211, 213 (1951); see also
Northern Pac. R.R. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958); Times-Picayune Publishing
Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 625 (1953); Fashion Originators' Guild v. FTC, 312
U.S. 457 (1941); Binderup v. Pathe Exchange, Inc., 263 U.S. 291 (1923); Eastern States
Retail Lumber Ass'n v. United States, 34 U.S. 600 (1914).
28. See, e.g., Klor's, 359 U.S. 207; Fashion Orginators" 312 U.S. 457; Worthen Bank &
Trust Co. v. National BankAmericard, Inc., 485 F.2d 119 (8th Cir. 1973), cert. dented, 415
U.S. 918 (1974).
29. See Klor's, 359 U.S. at 211. Under a per se analysis, it is "not for the courts to
decide whether in an individual case injury had actually occurred." Id; see also Radovich
v. National Football League, 352 U.S. 445, 453-54 (1957); United States v. Trenton Pot-
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deemed to have violated the Sherman Act. 30
The no-buy pledge has not been tested in the federal courts.
Federal courts may be hesitant to apply a per se analysis to the no-
buy pledge because of the nature of the interests involved.31 While
the typical boycott involves competing business entities, the no-
buy pledge pits tenants against a converter. Courts are unlikely to
apply a per se analysis when the challenged activity results from
social and political concerns.
32
Activities not characterized as per se violations of the Sherman
Act are tested under the "Rule of Reason. ' 33 Under this test,
plaintiffs must prove that the challenged activity's anticompetitive
effect outweighs its pro-competitive impact. 34 Even though the
"Rule of Reason" is strictly applied to boycotts, 35 the unique char-
acteristics of the no-buy pledge, as well as the surrounding circum-
stances in a given housing market, may satisfy the "Rule of
Reason" analysis.
36
The no-buy pledge does not involve traditional business compet-
itors. It attempts to preserve and protect tenants' homes, typically
arising only in areas where the free market system is affected by
rent control. Thus, a court could conclude that the no-buy pledge
30. See supra note 29.
31. Per se analysis is used less frequently when the purpose of the boycott is political
or social, rather than economic. See, e.g., United States v. Oregon State Medical Soc., 343
U.S. 326, 335 (1952); Missouri v. National Org. for Women, 620 F.2d 1301 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 842 (1980); Molinas v. National Basketball Ass'n, 190 F. Supp. 241
(S.D.N.Y. 1961).
32. See supra note 31.
33. See Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918).
34. The most often cited formulation of the "Rule of Reason" states:
The true test of legality is whether the restraint imposed is such as merely regu-
lates and perhaps thereby promotes competition or whether it is such as may
suppress or even destroy competition. To determine that question the court
must ordinarily consider the facts peculiar to the business to which the restraint
is applied; its condition before and after the restraint was imposed; the nature of
the restraint and its effect, actual or probable. The history of the restraint, the
evil believed to exist, the reason for adopting the particular remedy, the purpose
or end sought to be attained, are all relevant facts.
Id at 238.
35. Cf Mackey v. National Football League, 543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. dis-
missed, 434 U.S. 801 (1977).
36. A court might find, for example, that any anti-competitive effects of the no-buy
pledge are offset by the tenant's motive of protecting their homes and the effect on compe-
tition. See White & White, Inc. v. American Hospital Supply Corp., 540 F. Supp. 951 (D.
Mich. 1982); Williams v. Kleaveland, 534 F. Supp. 912 (D. Mich. 1981). But see National
Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978); United States v. Na-
tional Ass'n of Broadcasters, 536 F. Supp. 149 (D.D.C. 1982).
19841
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does not violate the Sherman Act. 37 Particular state statutes de-
claring housing crises, giving tenants the option to buy their apart-
ments, and requiring tenants' approval of the conversion plan
would all weigh in favor of the no-buy pledge. 3
Concern over whether the no-buy pledge falls under the aus-
pices of the Sherman Act may be unwarranted. Only activities in
or affecting interstate commerce are governed by the Sherman
Act. 39 The activities of a single tenants' association against the
landlord are not in interstate commerce. 40 Any effect upon inter-
state commerce could be de minimus and insufficient to invoke
federal jurisdiction. 41 Thus, the no-buy pledge may escape poten-
tial Sherman Act liability.
Although the no-buy pledge should withstand a federal anti-
trust challenge, the arrangement may be subject to state antitrust
laws.42 Most state antitrust statutes are modeled after the Sher-
man Act, 43 although some are broader in scope than the federal
laws.44 Courts located in areas not affected by housing shortages,
37. Se supra note 36; ef Missouri v. National Org. for Women, 620 F. 2d 1301 (8th
Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 842 (1980).
38. These factors could be considered when applying the "Rule of Reason." The no-
buy pledge would not, however, be exempt from antitrust laws under the doctrine of state-
action immunity because the tenants' actions are not actively supervised by state govern-
ment. In order to qualify for state-action immunity, the no-buy pledge would have to be
" 'clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed as state policy'; second, the policy must
be 'actively supervised' by the state itself." California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Mid-
cal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 104 (1980), citing, City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power
& Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 410 (1978); see also Community Communications Co. v. City of
Boulder, 455 U.S. 40 (1982); City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S.
389 (1978); Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579 (1976) (anticompetitive activity
illegal where not required by state regulations); Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
39. 15 U.S.C. 1 (1976); McLain v. Real Estate Bd., 444 U.S. 232 (1980); Hospital
Bldg. Co v. Trustees of Rex Hospital, 425 U.S. 738 (1976). Seegeneralgy P. AREEDA, ANTI-
TRUST LAW 90-99 (Supp. 1982) (interstate commerce discussion).
40. These activities are usually confined to the geographic location of the apartment
building.
41. The plaintiff in an antitrust action must show that the activity has a "not insub-
stantial effect" on the interstate commerce involved. McLain, 444 U.S. at 242. The lim-
ited effects of the no-buy pledge may not affect interstate commerce. See also Bain v.
Henderson, 621 F.2d 959 (9th Cir. 1980) (attorney appointment list); Cardio-Medical As-
soc. v. Crozer-Chester Med. Ctr., 552 F. Supp. 1170 (E.D. Penn. 1982) (hospital staff privi-
leges); Heille v. City of St. Paul, 512 F. Supp. 810 (D. Minn. 1981), afd, 671 F.2d 1134
(8th Cir. 1982) (rubbish); Dominion Parking Corp. v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 450 F. Supp.
441 (E.D. Va. 1978) (parking lots).
42. See supra note 18.
43. See id.
44. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 325D.53 (1982).
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rent control, or strict condominium conversion legislation may
hesitate to sanction the no-buy pledge.
Nonetheless, several states have declared housing emergencies
and passed corrective regulatory legislation. 45 Much of this legis-
lation increases tenants' rights when dealing with landlords and
condominium developers.46 One of the most common provisions
gives tenants the first right of refusal for their particular unit.
4 7
Another statute requires that a certain percentage of tenants ap-
prove the conversion plan in order for the conversion to take
place.48 Under these circumstances, state antitrust laws should sel-
dom, if ever, be construed to conflict with or nullify subsequent
emergency housing legislation.
49
In Pensic v. Sultzberger, 50 the New York County Supreme Court
addressed the issue of whether a no-buy pledge violated the Don-
nelly Act, 5 1 New York's state antitrust statute. The building own-
ers in Pensic challenged the no-buy pledge shortly after the New
York legislature had increased the percentage of tenant approval
required for conversions from fifteen to thirty-five percent. 52 The
court summarily rejected the plaintiffs' antitrust argument,
stating:
It is not unrealistic to assume that the increase in the percent-
age of tenant approval required was in contemplation of the
advisability of mutual consultation and discussion by tenants.
If tenants as a group choose to act together to protect them-
selves against an unacceptable plan, their rights in that regard
are no different from stockholders, joint venturers, or limited
partners who participate jointly in dealing with their real
property.
53
Pensic indicates that no-buy pledges may be able to withstand anti-
trust scrutiny under state statutes. Tenants should be aware that a
condominium developer may still allege antitrust violations and
45. See 1983 CAL. LEGIS. SERV. 665-66 (West) (urgency statute); N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW
§ 352eeee (McKinney Supp. 1982-1983) (serious public emergency because of acute hous-
ing shortage).
46. See supra note 45.
47. See 1983 CAL. LEGIS. SERV. 665-66 (West); MINN. STAT. § 515A.4-110 (1982);
N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 352eeee(2)(d)(ix) (McKinney Supp. 1982-1983).
48. N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 352eeee (McKinney Supp. 1982-1983).
49. For a general discussion of the rules of statutory interpretation, seeJ. DAVIES & R.
LAWRY, INSTITUTIONS AND METHODS OF THE LAW 191-213 (1982).
50. N.Y.L.J., July 16, 1970, at 2, col. 2 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County).
51. N.Y. GEN. Bus.. LAW. §§ 340-47 (McKinney 1968 & Supp. 1982-1983).
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claim treble damages. The tenants' association should be pre-
pared to defend itself against these claims.
B. Va/'di of No-Buy Pledge as a Binding Contract
No-buy pledges may also be vulnerable to attacks based on con-
tract doctrines of legal consideration 54 and mutuality of obliga-
tion.55 Courts are reluctant to enforce no-buy pledges where the
reciprocal obligations of each party are not clearly set out in the
agreement. Vermeer Committee for Fair Options v. Guterman, 56 for ex-
ample, involved the proposed conversion of a Manhattan rental
apartment building. The plaintiffs, representing forty-five percent
of the eligible tenants, sought to enjoin a second group of tenants
and the sponsor from declaring the eviction plan effective. Plain-
tiffs argued that the statutory minimum of thirty-five percent had
been achieved illegally through purchases by tenants who had pre-
viously signed no-buy pledges. 57 Defendants contended, inter aha,
the pledges were invalid for lack of consideration and mutuality of
obligation since no measurable standard of negotiation existed and
the obligations of the signors were vague and indefinite. 58 The
Vermeer Court denied the tenants' motion for a temporary injunc-
tion against proceeding with the conversion plan, holding that
"[t]here is a substantial question as to whether the . . .pledge is
supported by sufficient legal consideration . . .and embodies the
requirements fo [sic] concrete mutual reciprocal duties and obliga-
tions to qualify as a binding contractual relationship. '59
Subsequent lower New York court decisions, however, have
found that no-buy pledge agreements are valid and binding agree-
54. See generally 1&IA A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS §§ 109-159 (1963).
Corbin states that although the doctrine of consideration cannot be precisely defined, the
notions of "quidpro quo, something given as an agreed exchange, benefits received by the
promisor, detriments incurred by the promisee, action by the promisee in reasonable reli-
ance" are useful in understanding the concept. I A. CORBIN, supra, § 109, at 488. For
further discussion of the consideration doctrine, see Fridman, The Basis of Contractual Obh'-
gation. An Essay in SpeculativeJuisprudence, 7 Loy. L.A.L. REV. 1 (1974); Chloros, The Doc-
trine of Consideration and The Reform of the Law of Contract, 17 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 137 (1968);
Hamson, The Reform of Consideration, 54 LAW. Q. REv. 233 (1938); Hepple, Intention to Create
Legal Relations, 28 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 122 (1970).
55. Corbin states that "[miutuality of obligation should be used solely to express the
idea that each party is under a legal duty to the other; each has made a promise and each
is an obligor." IA A. CORBIN, supra note 54, § 152, at 4.
56. N.Y.LJ., May 13, 1980, at 6, col. 3 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County).
57. Id.
58. Id at col. 4.
59. Id at col. 5.
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ments. In 136 East 64th Street Tenant Association v. Bloom, 60 plaintiff
tenants sought to enjoin a conversion since more than seventy per-
cent of the tenants had signed no-buy pledges, thus precluding the
sponsor from obtaining subscription agreements from thirty-five
percent of the tenants as mandated by New York law.6 1 The prob-
lem arose when five of the original pledge signors violated their
pledges and subsequently executed subscription agreements. This
enabled the sponsor to obtain the percentage of purchasing ten-
ants necessary to proceed with the eviction plan.
The defendants claimed that the no-buy pledges were invalid,
alleging lack of consideration and no mutuality of obligation. The
court carefully analyzed the four page document and concluded:
The no-buy pledge agreement in this case is an extremely well-
drawn, formal document . . . Each signatory to the no-buy
pledge agreement promised and warranted that he would not
execute a subscription agreement for the purchase of any apart-
ment in the building until the happening of [certain events].
This phraseology clearly implies an obligation, duty and liabil-
ity on the part of each signatory.
62
The court in 345 West 70th Street Tenant Association v. 345 West
70th Tenants Corp. 63 reached a similar conclusion. In this case, the
sponsor of the conversion plan actively solicited tenants to sign
subscription agreements. The sponsor continued solicitation even
after the tenants moved the court to enjoin the sponsor from ac-
cepting further subscriptions from tenants who were parties to no-
buy pledge agreements."4
The court granted the tenants' motion for a preliminary injunc-
tion, rejecting defendant's argument that the signors of the pledge
did not understand its terms. The court stated:
[T]he obligations of the contract between the tenants must be
enforced. An examination of the subject document indicates
that it contains the required elements of a binding contract and
is sufficiently specific to allow the signors to understand the na-
ture of their obligations. Moreover, the agreement clearly pro-
vides that it can be enforced against those tenants who violate
its provisions. In these circumstances, it is apparent that
60. N.Y.L.J., June 17, 1981, at 6, col. 3 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County), moditfed, N.Y.L.J.,
Feb. 22, 1982, at 13, col. 1 (App. Div. 1st Dep't).
61. Id.
62. Id. at col. 4.
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injunctive relief is the only adequate remedy to insure against
the severe and irreparable harm to other signatories that would
take place by allowing the "No-Buy" agreement to be breached
65
As these cases illustrate, pledges must be drafted concisely so
that each party clearly understands the nature of its obligations.
Well-drawn documents should be able to withstand challenges
based on lack of consideration and mutuality of obligation.
C Misrepresentation, Duress, Disclosure Omissions, and Other
Equitable Issues
The validity and enforceability of no-buy pledges may be af-
fected by the manner in which the signatures were solicited. The
converter may allege that the tenants' association misrepresented
the nature of the pledge,66 solicited signatures through intimida-
tion of other tenants, 67 or made material omissions of disclosure.
68
65. Id In 227E 12th St. Assoc. v. 227E. 12th St. Tenants Ass'n, the court upheld a no-
buy pledge as a binding contract stating, "The sanctity of contracts must be respected."
N.Y.L.J., Sept. 7, 1982, at 7, col. 3 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County).
66. For example, in one case, various allegations of misconduct were made by the
sponsor-respondent, including misrepresentations as to the number of signatures to the no-
buy pledge in order to fraudulently induce the signing of additional pledges. Respon-
dent's Brief at 5, Vermeer Comm. for Fair Options v. Guterman, N.Y.L.J., May 13, 1980,
at 6, col. 3 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County), afy'd, 77 A.D.2d 505, 429 N.Y.S.2d 980 (App. Div. 1st
Dep't),appeal denied, 51 N.Y.2d 991,415 N.E.2d 981, 434 N.Y.S.2d 993 (1980). "Allegedly,
the Vermeer Committee repeatedly misrepresented the nature of the no-buy pledges, con-
veying the seemingly erroneous message that the pledges were only tactical devices for the
purpose of negotiating and were not legally binding agreements." Respondent's Brief at
7, Vermeer, N.Y.L.J., May 13, 1980, at 6, col. 3.
In one instance, tenants were told the pledge was not a binding document and was
nothing more than a show of support for a tenants' committee:
No sooner was the pledge distributed and signed by the building's tenants, when
a handful of proponents engaged an attorney who promptly disabused the ma-
jority of their misconception by writing a letter to all signatories stating, in clear
and unequivocal terms, that they had signed a valid contract, that they could
not now sign a subscription agreement with the sponsor. . . and that any tenant
who violated the terms of the pledge would be sued by the committee and by the
other tenants in the building.
Law Proposed to Regulate 'o Buy' Tenant Contracts, N.Y.L.J., March 16, 1983, at 19, col. 3.
When the sponsor asked a court for relief from the pledges, his action was dismissed for
lack of standing. Id
67. It is not inconceivable that an individual tenant may be harassed and intimidated
by other tenants both to sign no-buy pledges and to refrain from executing purchase
agreements. See generally Law Proposed to Regulate 'No Buy' Tenant Contracts, supra note 69, at
22, col. 1. If the harassment is held to constitute duress, the contract can be voided. See
IA A. CORBIN, supra note 54, § 228.
68. An example of misrepresentation by omission occurred when tenants were per-
suaded to sign a no-buy pledge without knowing, if they signed the pledge, the sponsor
would refuse to negotiate or amend a non-eviction plan, effectively foreclosing them from
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The provisions of the pledge itself may be vague, unconscionable,
or contrary to public policy.
Perhaps the most controversial issue is whether the tenants' asso-
ciation has a fiduciary or statutory duty to fully disclose all the
ramifications of a no-buy pledge once such a pledge is promul-
gated. A tenants' association, in soliciting no-buy pledges and un-
dertaking exclusive negotiations on behalf of its signatories, may
be acting as a securities broker negotiating on behalf of prospective
purchasers. 69 As such, the association may be subject to the full
disclosure requirements of federal 70 and state7' securities laws.
Some states have disclosure statutes which require the preparation
of a public offering statement in connection with a condominium
ever purchasing their apartment. See Vermeer Comm. for Fair Options v. Guterman,
N.Y.L.J., May 13, 1980, at 6, col. 3 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County), aj'd, 77 A.D. 505, 429
N.Y.S.2d 980 (1st Dep't), appeal denied, 434 N.Y.S.2d 993, 415 N.E.2d 981 (1980). Misrep-
resentation as to the nature of the pledge may justify rescission of the pledge on grounds of
mistake. See generally 3 A. CORBIN, supra note 54, § 610.
If the tenants' association derides the physical condition of the building through mis-
representation, the converter may have a cause of action for slander of product. The
Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act, 7A U.L.A. 45 (1978), a codification of the com-
mon law action for disparagement, provides that a person engages in a deceptive trade
practice when he "disparages the goods, services, or business of another by false or mis-
leading representation of fact." Id. at 50. The burden of proof in such an action would
probably be heavy since freedom of speech and collective bargaining agreements have a
constitutional imprimatur.
The free speech issue arose in the context of condominium conversions in Nyer v.
Munoz-Mendoza, 385 Mass. 184, 430 N.E.2d 1214 (1982), when a tenant posted a sign
advocating resistance to conversion on a door which connected common areas of the
building. The trial court granted a permanent injunction against any such signs in public
view including those within his own apartment. The Supreme Judicial Court of Massa-
chusetts held the signs constituted "pure speech" and that although the landlord had
significant interests, the injunction was unreasonably broad as it affected signs posted
within the tenant's apartment. Id.
The Nyer court noted that the constitutional policy against prior restraints of speech
applies even when the speech is false and defamatory. Because of this, the landlord might
not gain an injunction, but rather would be left with an action for damages. Id.; see also
227 E. 12th St. Assoc. v. 227 E. 12th St. Tenants Ass'n, N.Y.L.J., September 7, 1982, at 7,
col. 3 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County); Litwack, The Dot'rine ofPrtor Restraint, 12 HARV. C.R.-
C.L.L. REV. 519, 539-40 (1977).
69. The question of whether the sale of a condominium is a securities offering has
been the subject of voluminous litigation and literature. See, e.g., Ellsworth, Condominiums
are Securities?, 2 REAL EST. L.J. 694 (1974); Schneider, Developments in Defiing a "Security"
(Update), 16 REV. OF SEC. REG. 985 (1983); Schneider, The Elusive Defiition ofa "Security,"
14 REV. OF SEC. REG. 981 (1981); Note, Federal Securities Regulation of Condominiums: A Pur-
chaser's Perspective, 62 GEO. L.J. 1403 (1974); Comment, Condominium Regulation.- Beond Dis-
closure, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 639 (1975).
70. See Securities and Exchange Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 12 (1976); 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.10b-5 (1983).
71. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. §§ 80A.01-.31 (1982).
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conversion. 72 The no-buy pledge is conceivably within the pur-
view of such laws.
If the manner of solicitation was not objectionable, the con-
verter or the tenant seeking release from the pledge might refer to
the substance of the contract for relief from enforcement. The
terms of the pledge may be too vague or ambiguous to be enforce-
able. 73 The tenants' association can avoid such a challenge by
clarifying the no-buy pledge in accordance with the "plain lan-
guage" law of the jurisdiction.
7 4
The terms of the no-buy pledge may also be subject to attack on
the ground of unconscionability. The Supreme Court of New
York County has held a no-buy pledge to be unconscionable be-
cause it did not make clear to the signors that it contained a
waiver of certain rights.75
IV. REMEDIES FOR BREACH OF THE No-Buy PLEDGE
The tenants' association is generally entitled to obtain injunc-
tive relief against pledge violators as well as against the converter.
In 136 East 64th Street Tenants Association v. Bloom, 76 the court, after
ruling that the no-buy pledges were valid and legally binding, held
that all violating signatories were precluded from continuing with
their transactions until a final determination was made in the ac-
tion. Furthermore, the Bloom court held that the converter and
72. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 718.503 (West 1982); ME. REX,. STAT. ANN. tit. 33,
§ 1604-102 to -103, 1604-105 (Supp. 1982-1983); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 559.121,
§. 184a (Supp. 1983-1984); MINN. STAT. § 515A.4-104 (1982); N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 352-
e (McKinney Supp. 1982-1983); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 68, §§ 3401-02, 3401-04 (Purdon
Supp. 1983-1984); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 34-36.1-4.06 (Supp. 1982); W. VA. CODE § 36B-4-104
(Supp. 1983); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 703.33 (West 1981); see also UNIF. CONDOMINIUM ACT
§ 4-102, 7 U.L.A. 201 (1977).
73. The indefiniteness of essential terms may serve to prevent the creation of an en-
forceable contract. See I A. CORBIN, supra note 54, at § 95.
74. These laws require that consumer contracts be written in a clear and coherent
manner, use words with common and everyday meanings, and be captioned and divided
by their various sections. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 325G.31 (1982). These statutes gener-
ally apply only to consumer contracts, however, a no-buy pledge written in accordance
with such a statute will probably withstand an attack based on vagueness or ambiguity.
75. Memorandum of Law at 8, 345 W. 70th St. Tenants Ass'n v. 345 W. 70th Tenants
Corp., N.Y.L.J., Nov. 24, 1981, at 6, col. 3 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County). The court was per-
suaded that the failure to inform the tenants of the waivers expressed in the pledge was
sufficiently unfair to relieve them of its enforcement. "[Tjhe waiver of the rights of a
tenant in a building undergoing a condominium conversion should not be sanctioned; at a
minimum, they should be subject to the most careful scrutiny before they are deemed
waived." Id.
76. N.Y.L.J. June 17, 1981, at 6, col. 3 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County).
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selling agent could not proceed with the eviction plan pending a
final determination of the action.7" In New York, where an evic-
tion plan is converted to a non-eviction plan, injunctive relief will
not be granted to tenants seeking to enforce a no-buy pledge, since
they can not show irreparable harm.78 The tenants' rights of con-
tinued occupancy would not be affected by the consummation of
the non-eviction plan.
V. MODEL No-Buy PLEDGE
Given the importance of the no-buy pledge and the increase in
its use, a model form that is clearly written and reasonable for all
parties is desirable. One such form has recently been drafted. 79 Its
release mechanism is reasonable, and fair to both tenants and con-
verter. The pledge is effective for forty-five days after presentation
of the final offering plan. It must then be reaffirmed by the neces-
sary percentage of the tenants in order to remain in effect.80 Simi-
lar to all pledges, the tenant consents to the granting of injunctive
relief in the event the pledge is breached and also consents to the
jurisdiction of the court of general jurisdiction.
VI. CONCLUSION
This Article is intended as a survey of the myriad legal issues
that are presented when tenants in a building undergoing conver-
sion to condominium status make use of no-buy pledges. Many of
the legal issues that arise are generated by the very nature of such
pledges, to the extent that they involve boycotts or organized eco-
nomic pressure. Still other legal complications may or may not
arise, depending upon such variables as the degree of disclosure
made by the individuals sponsoring the pledge, the presence or
77. Id.; see a/so 345 W. 70th St. Tenants Ass'n v. 345 W. 70th Tenants Corp., N.Y.L.J.,
Nov. 24, 1981, at 6, col. 3 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County).
78. Wilshire Tenants Ass'n v. Spiegel, N.Y.LJ., Nov. 12, 1981, at 12, col. I (Sup. Ct.
N.Y. County). In Vermeer Comm. for Fair Options v. Guterman, N.Y.L.J., May 13,
1980, at 6, col. 3 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County), af'd, 77 A.D. 505, 429 N.Y.S.2d 980 (1st Dep't),
appeal denied, 415 N.E.2d 981, 434 N.Y.S.2d 993 (1980), the court denied a motion for an
injunction and found that damages would provide an adequate remedy. This finding
might not have been made if other grounds for denying the preliminary injunction did not
exist. Id
79. A model no-buy pledge is contained in the Appendix to this Article.
80. In New York City, each tenant is granted an exclusive right, for a period of ninety
days, to purchase his apartment. The model pledge, therefore, gives each tenant a sub-
stantial period of time to purchase in the event the pledge is not reaffirmed by the requi-
site percentage.
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absence of a conflict of interest on the part of the sponsors of the
pledge, the agreement's duration, and the reasonableness of relief
mechanisms, if any.
Some states may find such pledges to be violative of their com-
mon law or statutes, while other jurisdictions may sustain them, at
least where the pledges have not been tainted by other facts or
circumstances. As these pledges turn up with increased frequency
in conversion situations, still other issues may arise, as, for exam-
ple, whether a successor tenant is bound by a no-buy pledge exe-
cuted by his predecessor or assignor. The state legislatures are not
likely to resolve the issues presented by no-buy pledges, for fear of
being viewed as denying consumers or tenants the right to band
together for mutual protection and benefit. Accordingly, the
courts will be called upon to sort out the relevant considerations in
such cases. In passing upon this sort of agreement, the judiciary
should take the long view and eschew facile generalizations. Un-
fortunately, here, as in so many areas of daily living, lay people
often do not appreciate what they are agreeing to when they sign a
piece of paper. While it is not the law's primary function to pro-
tect the careless or uninformed, agreements entered into casually,
and without the aid of counsel, should not be so construed as to
become a millstone around the neck of the signatories, especially








MODEL No-Buy PLEDGE AGREEMENTt
Warning: This is a binding legal agreement. By signing it you
may lose your right to buy your apartment or any other apartment
in the building and you may subject yourself to severe penalties if
you should attempt to do so.
Building address
(herein called the Building)
New York
Tenant(s) name(s)
(herein called the Undersigned Pledgor, whether one or more)
Apartment No. (herein called the Apartment)
The Undersigned Pledgor is the tenant of the Apartment and
has received or expects soon to receive a copy of an offering plan to
convert the Building to condominium or cooperative ownership on
an eviction basis (herein called the Plan), under which the Under-
signed Pledgor will have the right to purchase the Apartment.
In consideration of tenants of other apartments in the Building
signing pledge agreements containing the'same terms and provi-
sions as this one (all such signing tenants, including the Under-
signed Pledgor, being herein called Pledging Tenants), the
Undersigned Pledgor agrees as follows:
1. No-Buy Pledge. During
the period that this pledge
agreement is in effect, the Un-
dersigned Pledgor will not
purchase or agree to purchase
either the Apartment or any
other apartment in the Build-
ing. The Undersigned Pledgor
represents and warrants that no
other person is named in the
lease or has otherwise acquired
tenancy rights to the
Apartment.
2. Amendments of Plan.
Except as provided in para-
graph 5, this pledge agreement
shall not be terminated by any
amendment of the Plan.
3. Initial Effectiveness.
This pledge agreement shall be-
come effective 3 business days
after signing. It shall thereafter
remain in effect until 45 days
after formal presentation of the
filed version of the Plan to ten-
ants of the Building (herein
called the Presentation Date).
Its effectiveness may be ex-
t Copyright 1982. Julius Blumberg, Inc., Publisher. This model was drafted by
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tended as provided in para-
graph 4.
4. Continued Effectiveness.
This pledge agreement shall
cease to be effective at the end
of the period of initial effective-
ness mentioned in paragraph 3
unless no later than 5 business
days prior to that time every
Pledging Tenant shall have
been sent written notice by cer-
tified or registered mail, return
receipt requested, advising that
similar unrevoked pledge agree-
ments have been signed and ac-
knowledged by tenants of more
than -% of the apartments in
the Building and identifying all
such Pledging Tenants and
their apartments, in, which
event this pledge agreement
shall (unless sooner terminated
as hereinafter provided) remain
in effect until 20 months after
the Presentation Date.
5. Termination. This
pledge agreement shall cease to
be effective (a) if the Plan is
changed to a wholly non-evic-
tion plan or (b) if a majority of
the Pledging Tenants signify in
writing that they desire that
these pledge agreements shall
no longer be binding.
6. Monetary Damages.
The Undersigned Pledgor ac-
knowledges that other Pledging
Tenants may become entitled
to collect substantial amounts
of money from the Undersigned
Pledgor if the Undersigned
Pledgor violates this pledge
agreement.
7. Injunction. The Under-
signed Pledgor further acknowl-
edges that, because consumma-
tion of the Plan may result in
eviction and because monetary
damages may be difficult to as-
sess with precision, other Pledg-
ing Tenants may have no ade-
quate remedy at law. The Un-
dersigned Pledgor accordingly
agrees that other Pledging Ten-
ants shall be entitled as of right
to obtain injunctive relief to re-
strain or undo any threatened
or actual violation of this
pledge agreement.
8. Consent to Jurisdiction.
The Undersigned Pledgor sub-
mits to the jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court of the State of
New York, in the county in
which the Building is situated,
and agrees that any action by
other Pledging Tenants to en-
force this pledge agreement
may be commenced against the
Undersigned Pledgor by service
of a summons by certified or
registered mail, return receipt
requested, addressed to the Un-
dersigned Pledgor at the
Apartment.
9. No Assurances. The
Undersigned Pledgor under-
stands that no statements made
by any person, including the
person soliciting this pledge
agreement, shall have any effect
upon its validity or enforceabil-
ity. The Undersigned Pledgor
[Vol. 10
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specifically acknowledges that resentatives and other succes-
no assurances have been given sors in interest of the Under-
to the effect that this pledge signed Pledgor.
agreement will not be fully 13. Certain Definitions.
enforced. For purposes of this pledge
10. No Other Obligations. agreement, (a) all of the co-ten-
Nothing contained in this ants of any one apartment shall
pledge agreement shall under be considered to be collectively
any circumstances require the only one tenant and (b) in the
Undersigned Pledgor either to case of a cooperative, purchas-
purchase any apartment or to ing an apartment shall mean
contribute any money to oppose purchasing the corporate shares
the Plan. allocated to that apartment.
11. Separability. The inva- 14. Revocability. This
lidity or unenforceability of any pledge agreement may be re-
portion of this pledge agree- yoked by a writing by the Un-
ment shall not affect other dersigned Pledgor before it be-
portions. comes effective as provided in
12. Successors. This paragraph 3. Thereafter it shall
pledge agreement shall inure to be irrevocable, but it may be
the benefit of and be binding modified by a writing signed by
upon the assigns, personal rep- all Pledging Tenants.
I certify that I have read and understand this agreement
and that I have received a copy.
Dated L.S.
Tenant Pledgor
I certify that I have read and understand this agreement
and that I have received a copy.
Dated L.S.
Tenant Pledgor
(if more than one)
19841
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Acknowledgement
STATE OF NEW YORK )
COUNTY OF )ss.:
On the date set forth above, before me personally came
to me known to be the person(s) described in and who executed
the foregoing pledge agreement, and the person(s) duly acknowl-
edged to me execution of the same.
Notary Public
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